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I
INTRODUCTION

What determines the terms that parties include in a contract? At the most
fundamental level, a contract is a reassignment of property rights. If parties
voluntarily enter such a reassignment, it must be the case that the
reassignment is moving property towards the party who places the higher
value on it. Thus, ifrA contracts to sell B a car for $5000, A must value the car
at no more than $5000, and B must value it at no less than $5000. This view
explains all clauses of contracts as reassigning property rights on the basis of
economic efficiency: If the contract states that the purchaser of a house receives
the window screens or the seller of an appliance bears the risk of malfunction
for thirty days, we understand those clauses as part of an optimal
reallocation.'
To be sure, the economic claim is in fact only that rights will be used by
those with the highest valuation for them. A retailer contracts for the
purchase of a load of clothing not because his own valuation of the goods is
higher than the price, but because he anticipates the finding of further
purchasers for whom the goods' value exceeds the price. Similarly, the typical
purchaser of a commodity futures contract does not anticipate using the
commodity himself.
Although the claim in strict form predicts only ultimate disposition of
property rights, we would still expect that there is a tendency in any
transaction for rights to move to the user who values them the most. For in
general, establishing an exchange is an expensive procedure. Bargaining is
time-consuming, and the lawyers, secretaries, and other specialized staff
necessary to establish an agreement are costly. Should an agreement send
goods to a party who valued the goods less than another party, further
agreements will be necessary to reallocate the goods correctly. Thus, the
costs of contracting are minimized by getting the allocation right in the first
place.
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On the other hand, when there is uncertainty, there is an opposing
tendency not to get the agreement correct at the time of contracting. In any
complex arrangement, many of the provisions will depend on contingencies
that may arise. Normally, the buyer of a house may wish to purchase the
fixtures as well; but perhaps he unexpectedly finds himself in circumstances in
which it is necessary to carry out extensive interior alterations, so that the
current fixtures are suddenly of no use to him. At the same time, perhaps the
seller learns that his new house lacks the fixtures or perhaps he has a special
attachment to some of them. When decisions are interrelated in complex
ways, the correct ultimate allocation may include a complex set of
contingencies. Rather than getting everything right initially, contracting
parties may prefer to wait until the uncertainty is resolved and only then
establish the specific bundle of rights to be transferred.
Thus, the decision as to which clauses to incorporate in a contract involves
a tradeoff between increased accuracy and increased simplicity. On one hand,
the contract should incorporate the array of contingent arrangements so as to
make renegotiation and rewriting unnecessary. On the other hand, the
contract should include only terms for those contingencies likely to arise.
According to this view, there remains a tendency for contracts to assign
property rights to those for whom the property has the highest value-only
now the tendency becomes a probabilisticprediction. At any round of contract
formulation, the contract will tend to provide that assets be assigned to the
party who will most likely have the highest valuation for them. If
contingencies work out in their most likely resolutions, no further
reassignment is necessary. If surprises arise, so that the allocation initially
agreed upon is sub-optimal, then renegotiation occurs.
This view of renegotiation-as restoring the allocation of property to its
expected optimum in the event that surprises render previously established
allocations sub-optimal-lies behind many descriptions of contract
formulation and renegotiation in economics. A typical example is the model
of Dye, which assumes that working out contractual details is a costly
procedure and consequently that contracts contain only a limited amount of
detail. 2 Many of the contracting models used in macroeconomics have similar
assumptions behind them.3 Several models of renegotiation assume the
permitted contracts are in a limited set, and as the circumstances vary, the
current contract reaches a sub-optimal point at which a new choice becomes
4
necessary.
2. Dye, Costly Contract Contingencies, 26 INT'L EcON. REV. 233 (1985). For other models
incorporating renegotiation for remedying incompleteness of contracts, see Rogerson, Efficient
Reliance and Damage Measuresfor Breach of Contracts, 15 RANDJ. ECON. 39 (1984); Shavell, The Design of
Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 Q. J. ECON. 121 (1984).
3. See, e.g., Gray, Wage Indexation: A Macroeconomic Approach, 2 J. MONETARY ECON. 221 (1976);
Taylor, Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts, 88 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1980).
4. Dye, Optimal Length of Labor Contracts, 26 INT'L ECON. REV. 251 (1985); Harris & Holmstrom,
On the Durationof Agreements, 28 INT'L ECON. REV. 389 (1987). See also Gray, On Indexation and Contract
Length, 86J. POL. ECON. 1 (1978).
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All of these structures yield the understanding that the terms of a contract
are specified to minimize future renegotiation. As a consequence, these
structures predict that the terms specified in the contract are the terms most
likely to be carried out in practice. There are, however, important situations
that do not appear to conform to this prediction. A common example of a
clause that does not conform is the provision of security for a loan.
When a bank makes a loan to a firm or home purchaser, the agreement
may stipulate that the asset purchased serve as security for the loan. In other
words, the bank stipulates that the asset can be seized should the borrower
not repay. Nonetheless, it is expected that in the event the borrower does end
up short, the loan would be renegotiated, as banks are typically less efficient
managers of assets than are borrowers. It is rare for the threatened seizure of
assets to take place. Why then go through the ritual of including such a
provision?

In this article we show that contract terms may have purposes other than
simply specifying efficient outcomes. Some clauses in a contract may be
designed to place one party or the other in a strong position in the event of
any renegotiation of the contract. We demonstrate that such pre-positioning
can serve a useful purpose. We develop an imperfect information model in
which a secured loan contract with renegotiation will achieve efficient
outcomes while no other simple contract can. We use our structure to analyze
and compare the efficiency of various rules for foreclosure of mortgages.
In previous articles 5 we explored this use of renegotiation for strategic
purposes, rather than as a remedy in the event of surprises. The distinction
between the two explanations of renegotiation was highlighted by
examination of situations in which there was no uncertainty (and therefore no
possibility of surprise). In this article, uncertainty is integral to the model we
develop; thus the renegotiation we observe is characterized by both strategy
and surprise.
II
A

MODEL OF SECURED LOANS

An entrepreneur has an idea for a project that may be initiated at a cost of
K dollars. If this amount is greater than the entrepreneur's resources, the
project will require a loan. (For simplicity, we treat the entrepreneur as
having no resources of his own.) The project's value is
wxy (a + 1),
where the parameters are interpreted as follows: The variable w is a preinvestment signal of the quality of the project. It is observed only by the

entrepreneur and his bank. If (and only if) it is high enough, the project is
worth undertaking. We study the contractual arrangement between the bank
5. Huberman & Kahn, Limited Contract Enforcement and Strategic Renegotiation, 78 AM. ECON. REV.
471 (1988); G. Huberman & C. Kahn, Strategic Renegotiation and Contractual Simplicity (July 1987)
(unpublished manuscript).
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and the entrepreneur assuming that w is sufficient for the investment to be
desirable. By assuming that w is known only to the bank and the
entrepreneur, we model a situation in which the two parties enjoy a special
relation, and the entrepreneur cannot replace his current lender with another.
Given this justification of the special relation, the specific value of w is
inessential. Therefore, we may assume that w is fixed and that this value is
sufficiently high to justify the exclusive relation between the bank and the
entrepreneur. We need not consider w further.
Once the investment is made, y is realized and becomes known to the
entrepreneur and to the bank. Thus, we can regard y as a post-investment
signal of the profitability of the project. Let the distribution of y be denoted
F(y);
F(y) = 0 for y < 0.
The variable a represents an effort level that is subsequently chosen by the

entrepreneur. For concreteness, we suppose the variable takes on only one of
two values: 0 or 1. Positive effort costs the entrepreneur an amount C. The
choice of ownership is denoted by x: x = 2 if the entrepreneur owns the
project; otherwise it is 1.
"Ownership" deserves an explanation. In general we expect the rights to
goods to be held by those who value them most. It is easy to imagine in some
cases that the same good could yield different values depending on who holds
it.

Housing services are a natural example:

One way of modeling the

situation is to describe the output (housing services) as a joint product of the
physical asset (housing) and particular capacities embodied in the person
dwelling in the house so that the housing yields greater services when
combined with one dweller than with another.
Similar effects can be had in the case of entrepreneurial investments: The
outcome of the project may depend on the physical investments and the skills
of the entrepreneur in charge. For example, whoever is in possession of the
asset may thereby be privy to information possessed by no one else. The
entrepreneur uses such information to enhance the value of the asset. People

have different abilities, and, in the situation we are modeling, we assume that
the original entrepreneur has more ability than anybody else. That the
project is worth more if the entrepreneur owns it implies that on efficiency
grounds alone, ownership should rest with the entrepreneur. 6 There is a
second, natural aspect to ownership of an investment project: The owner is
the residual claimant of any values associated with the project.
6. The separation between ownership and control has always been a puzzle for economics.
Recently, the theoretical literature has reexamined situations in which the value of assets depends on
who controls decisions about their use. For papers in this vein, see Grossman & Hart, The Costs and
Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. EcON. 691 (1986); Hart &
Moore, Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988); Aghion & Bolton, An
"Incomplete Contract" Approach to Bankruptcy and the Financial Structure of the Firm (Mar. 1988)
(unpublished working paper).
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We assume that the entrepreneur and the lender are both risk-neutral.
The bank borrows or lends money at the risk-free market rate of interest.
Therefore, whenever we describe the costs or benefits to the bank of future
receipts or disbursements of money, we automatically translate these streams
of payment into their present discounted values. The entrepreneur has
limited access to the capital market. That is to say, he can lend to third parties
at the risk-free rate, but if he borrows on the outside market, he will pay a
premium over the amounts the bank pays to get funds from other sources.
(We could justify this imperfection in the capital market on other
informational grounds, but we do not pursue those possibilities here.)
This difference in ability to borrow or lend on capital markets implies that
there are gains to be had by the two parties entering into some agreement.
Equivalent results could be generated by using a model with risk aversion,
and positing different degrees of risk aversion for the entrepreneur and the
bank. Another possibility would be to start by incorporating limited liability
into the analysis; the resultant behavior would be similar to that induced by
differences in abilities to borrow. However, we have preferred to avoid
beginning with an appeal to limited liability. Otherwise we would have to
address the question of whether the need to incorporate renegotiation into
contracts stemmed from the existence of limited liability itself. By using this
formulation we show that it does not. As we have noted, the values of the
signals w and y and the effort level are not known by any third party. The only
variables observable by third parties are the ownership of the asset and any
payments made.
It is useful to begin our analysis of this problem by examining the efficient
allocation in the case of full information. The efficient allocation is
characterized by the following considerations:
(1) The ownership of the asset should always be vested in the
entrepreneur, since the project will have a higher value when x = 2.
(2) The entrepreneur should invest effort in the production process
whenever
w" 2- 2 y-C > w 2 1 y.
This inequality simply states that what the entrepreneur adds in
value to the project through a high level of effort (a= 1) must be
greater than his cost, C, in doing so. If not, he should not expend
any effort. This inequality may be rewritten as
y > C/(2w).
(3) Payments made by the entrepreneur to the bank should never
be greater than
w * 2 - y(a+l) - Ca,
which is the net benefit of the project in a realization.
(4) Finally, the project should be undertaken initially if, and only if,
the expectation of the net benefit of the project is greater than K:
f max ( 2 wy, 4wy - C) dF(y) > K.
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III
CONTRACTS

Next we consider various contracts that could be offered in this
environment. Recall that contracts cannot directly depend on realizations of
y,w, or a, since these variables are not observed by outside parties.
The simplest contract merely specifies who owns the project and what
monetary payment, if any, is to be made. The next simplest contract is one
that gives one party the option to transfer the ownership to the other for a
specified price. Such contracts can take many forms. For example,
contracting parties frequently treat the good as security for the loan: At his
option, the borrower either pays the specified repayment of the loan or gives
up the security to the lender. We will concentrate on this form of the
contract. We will examine the security contract that gives zero expected
profits to the lender. (To justify concentrating on the zero-profits contract,
assume that at the outset there are a large number of banks, each potentially
possessing the ability to enter the special relationship with the entrepreneur,
and therefore competing away their expected profits from the arrangement.)
To evaluate contracts in the presence of possible renegotiation requires a
theory of the outcomes of negotiations. We assume that negotiations work as
follows: If parties are already committed to an outcome that is Pareto
optimal, then there is no further negotiation. If, however, previously signed
contracts commit the parties to an inefficent outcome such that both sides
could gain from a renegotiation, then further negotiation will occur. We
assume that the outcome that the parties reach as a result of the renegotiation
7
is an efficient outcome in which the gains from the move are split evenly.
In the case of a contract in which one party has the right to exercise an
option, renegotiation works as follows: If the party owning the option prefers
the alternative that is Pareto optimal, no renegotiation occurs, and the party
carries out his preferred alternative. Suppose on the other hand that the party
owning the option personally prefers the alternative that is Pareto inferiorthat is, the other party is willing to offer a side payment large enough to
induce the party owning the option to switch away from his preferred
alternative. In this case, renegotiation will occur. The assumption of equal
division of the gains determines the size of the resultant side payment.
We consider the following secured loan arrangement: The entrepreneur
agrees to repay T to the lender. If the entrepreneur fails to repay, then the
lender receives the assets in the project.
7. Given the risk neutrality of both parties, this assumption implies the choice of the Nash
bargaining solution.
The literature on bargaining and predicted outcomes of bargaining is voluminous. An important
non-cooperative model is Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50 ECONOMETRICA 97
(1982). For cooperative game theoretical approaches, of which equal division and Nash bargaining
solutions are notable examples, see R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND
CRITICAL SURVEY (1958).
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How does such an agreement work in the presence of renegotiation?
Consider the point at which the entrepreneur has the option of handing over
the asset or of paying up. If the value of the asset to the entrepreneur is
greater than T, he prefers to pay and retain the asset. If the value of the asset
is less than T, he prefers to threaten to hand over the asset to the bank. Given
this threat, which is credible unless the contract is renegotiated, the bank
prefers to renegotiate the initial loan.
The value to the bank of the unrenegotiated loan is
wy (a+ 1),
which is equal to the value of the project when x= 1 (since the entrepreneur
no longer owns the project). The value to the entrepreneur of the
unrenegotiated loan is -aC, which represents his costs in terms of the effort
he put into the project. The social value of leaving the asset in the
entrepreneur's hands is
2 wy (a+ 1) - aC.
According to our bargaining theory, each party will receive half of the
difference of the gain from leaving the project in the entrepreneur's hands;
thus the total payment by the entrepreneur to the bank is
1.5 wy (a+ 1).
The net benefit to the entrepreneur is
max (.5 wy (a+ )-aC, 2 wy (a+ l)-aC-T),
and the net benefit to the bank is
min (1.5 * wy (a+ 1), T).
Next we consider the entrepreneur's decisions regarding the effort he will
expend under a secured loan contract, given his awareness of the outcomes of
the subsequent bargaining as described above. The entrepreneur prefers to
choose a = 1 if and only if, y is above some critical level. He chooses a to
solve the following problem:
max(max J(.5 wy (a+l) -

aC), (2 wy (a+1) - aC -

T)J)

a
The first value in the brackets represents his income from a renegotiated
project; the second represents income where no renegotiation takes place.
The entrepreneur will choose a to maximize the larger of the two values.
Straightforward calculation demonstrates that it is optimal to set a equal to
zero if
(1.5 wy > T and 2 wy > 4 wy-C),
or if
(1.5 wy < T < 3 wy and .5 wy > 4wy-T-C),

or if
(3 wy < T and .5 wy > wy-C).

Otherwise, it is optimal to set a equal to one.
Thus, if
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.75 C > T,
(1)
a is chosen efficiently.
Provided (1) holds, T is defined by the requirement that the lender make
zero expected profits. In other words,
f min (1.5 wy, T) dF(y) = K.
(This simplified version of the profits formula is valid because when (1)
holds, the entrepreneur chooses a equal to zero whenever T exceeds the
project's value.) Note that T is therefore greater than K, the difference
representing the default premium. Thus provided
f min (1.5 wy, .75 C) dF(y) > K,
the efficient solution is generated by this security contract. It can be verified
that in these cases the value of the project does indeed exceed the cost of it.
Next we consider alternative simple contracts and demonstrate that none
of these alternatives would be successful.
(1) The simplest contract would be one that requires the debtor
unconditionally to pay the creditor an amount K. In effect we could
describe such a contract as holding the debtor personally liable for
the debt. In this context, we could interpret such liability as courtenforced repayment even in circumstances where the debtor must
obtain funds beyond those generated by the project. (Imagine, for
example, a garnishment of wages in another job.) Such a
requirement would be complicated by the costs of enforcing the
contract if the debtor attempts to default. We will consider the
complications of court costs below; for now, however, note that even
if the enforcement costs were zero, this contract would not be as
desirable as the security contract because it would inefficiently
allocate the risk of repayment. Note the following related
undesirable effect of such a contract: It would, for certain values of y,
cause over-investment in effort as the debtor attempted to avoid
being required to obtain outside funds to repay his debts.
(2) A second possibility would be for the bank to own the project
and, at its discretion, hand the project over to the entrepreneur for a
consideration. This possibility would also be inefficient relative to
the security contract: Since the bank will share in the gains made as a
result of the investment by the entrepreneur, the entrepreneur will
tend to under-invest in effort. 8
(3) In a world that prohibited renegotiation, no simple contract
would be efficient. If a contract specified that in some circumstances
the asset were to end up in the wrong hands, it would be inefficient.
But the only alternative for an unrenegotiated contract is one in
8. This is a specific example of the "hold-up problem." For the development of firms as a
response to the hold-up problem, see 0. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM:
FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration,
Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive ContractingProcess, 21 J. L. ECON. 297 (1978).
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which the asset remains in the same hands in all realizations. In this
case, the only incentive-compatible contract is one in which the
payment does not vary with the realization of y.
In summary: We have established a simple economic structure in which a
security contract with renegotiation dominates any other simple contract.
The security contract allows the payment from the entrepreneur to the bank
to vary in a flexible way, depending on the realization of the outcome of the
project, even though this amount is not stated in the contract and cannot be
stated effectively since it is not observable by any third party.
This flexibility makes renegotiation a useful tool, but does not by itself
explain the usefulness of security contracts. The security contract dominates
other contracts because it places the asset in the proper party's hands,
depending on the realization of the outcome of the project. Because the
owner gets residual claims to the benefits of the asset, we want the ownersfiip
of the asset to be in the hands of the entrepreneur in any state in which it is
worthwhile for him to make additional effort investments. On the other hand,
we want the asset in the hands of the bank in low productivity states-that is,
those states in which additional effort is not useful-in order to enable the
bank to obtain some value from the project through bargaining in those
states. We do not want the bank to have the right to personal liability of the
entrepreneur for the debt, since that right would eliminate the proper risksharing in the agreement.
IV
RULES AND COSTS OF ENFORCEMENT

Thus far, we have made extremely simple assumptions about the
enforcement of the right of the lender to take over the asset in the case of
default. We have assumed that in the event of a default, the banker can
appropriate the project without cost and at his own discretion. It is this threat
which gives him residual bargaining power in the renegotiation.
This procedure comes closest to describing the most primitive version of
foreclosure, namely strict foreclosure. In the United States, strict foreclosure
remains permissible in only a handful of states. In most states it has been
supplanted byjudicialforeclosure. Under classical judicial foreclosure, the assets
of the defaulting borrower are taken over and sold by the court. If their value
exceeds the amount of the debt, the balance is given to the debtor. If their
value is less than the amount of the debt, then a deficiency judgment may be
rendered, in appropriate circumstances, against the debtor for the balance.
The court's actions provide procedural safeguards for the debtor and are
generally more costly than a direct takeover of the assets by the creditor. 9

In response to the rise in judicial foreclosure, parties to contracts resorted
to including terms for foreclosure as part of their contracts. In some respects,
this non-judicialforeclosure is a return to the older terms of strict foreclosure.
9.

P.

GOLDSTEIN, REAL PROPERTY

443 (1984).
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In this section we will compare the effectiveness of strict and judicial
foreclosure in determining whether secured loan contracts can lead to
efficient outcomes. To the model of the previous section we add one simple
assumption: The costs of a court-administered foreclosure are a constant p.
A.

Case I: Court Protection of Debtors

Imagine that the court enforces a rule that the lender can recover an
amount no greater than the face value of the debt (plus court costs); any
excess value will be returned to the borrower. (This rule is often enforced by
judicially-held public auction of the property.) How will such a rule affect the
efficiency of secured loans?
As long as the value of the asset to the entrepreneur is greater than the
value to any third-party buyer, the value of the asset when sold will never
exceed the value to the entrepreneur. Thus the main effect of the new rule
arises through the imposition of extra court costs. In the case of default, the
new rule implies that the bank will receive a reduced value from the assets:
wy(a + 1) - p.

The net social gain from avoiding a default and leaving the asset in the
entrepreneur's hands is therefore
wy(a + 1) + p
-that is to say, the avoidance of court costs becomes an extra gain in
renegotiating away from default. The gain is split evenly between the parties,
so that the entrepreneur now receives
(2)

max 1.5 wy (a + 1) + .5 p - aC, 2wy (a + 1) - aC -

TJ

and the bank receives
min 11.5 wy (a + 1) - .5p,
How does this change affect the entrepreneur's
entrepreneur picks a to maximize (2); calculations
previous section show that the entrepreneur will
effort provided
.75C > T + .5 p.

T].
incentives to invest? The
analogous to those in the
pick the efficient level of

To clarify, note that the entrepreneur's objective function here is the same as
his objective function in the previous section, with T + .5p substituted for T.
Furthermore, the efficient choice of a is independent of the cost p, provided
that renegotiation will allow the avoidance of court appearances.
The zero-profits level of T is defined by the expression
f min 11.5 wy - .5 p, TJ dF(y) = K,
so that efficient outcomes are achievable with the secured loan contract,
provided that
f p min (1.5 wy, .75C) dF(y) > K + .5 p.
Note, therefore, that the presence of court costs decreases the likelihood
of achieving the efficient outcome with a secured loan contract, even though
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the court is never actually used-that is to say, even though in practice the
parties always renegotiate rather than submit to judicial foreclosure. The
court costs become important because they impose an extra burden on the
lender, reducing his power in any renegotiation away from an inefficient
outcome.
B.

Case II: Court Protection of Creditors

Now imagine that the court enforces deficiency judgments: If the value of
the asset falls short of the debt, the court will assess the debtor for the
balance. In contrast to the previous case, deficiency judgments in this case
destroy the usefulness of the secured loan contract entirely-even if the
debtor is not assessed court costs.
For example, consider the debtor's choices of whether or not to default in
a regime with deficiency judgments. If the debtor wishes to avoid foreclosure
and the asset is not worth the value of the indebtedness, then the debtor will
have to obtain costly funds. However, if the debtor does default, because the
asset is worth less on the open market than it is to the debtor, the debtor will
be forced to obtain even a greater amount of costly funds. Thus the debtor
never threatens bankruptcy, and contracts are never renegotiated. In effect, a
regime with deficiency judgments is equivalent to a regime in which
renegotiation is prohibited.' 0
V
REMAINING ISSUES:

NON-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE

Given the restrictions inherent in the process of judicial foreclosure, it is
not surprising that the procedure has largely been supplanted by non-judicial
foreclosure-the inclusion of terms in the loan contract specifying the
circumstances and procedures by which the lender will obtain assets from the
borrower in the event of default. Non-judicial foreclosure is in effect a form
of liquidated damages, a statement by the parties as to the remedies to be
applied in the event of breach of the contract. Although it is not surprising
that non-judicial foreclosure would be preferred to a court-mandated
foreclosure procedure, it is perhaps surprising to learn which of the aspects of
judicial foreclosure are the most disadvantageous. Our preceding analysis
indicates that it is the use of deficiency judgments even more than the
costliness of the litigation itself that leads to the avoidance of judicial
foreclosure.
If this conclusion is correct, it implies two interesting classes of
predictions. The first involves the terms of observed contracts. Our
10. This result is complicated by the fact that deficiency judgments themselves may not always
be effective. Despite receiving the judgment, the creditor may not collect if, for example, the debtor
declares bankruptcy or skips town. If the creditor predicts that a deficiency judgment will not
actually result in any payment, then the problem reduces itself to that of the previous section. To the
extent that deficiency judgments are successful, they neutralize the value of foreclosure as an element
in strategic renegotiation.
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description of secured-loan contracts predicts a tendency for such contracts to
specify that, in the event of default, the debtor's liability will be limited to the
surrender of the secured property.1 '
The second class of predictions involves legislative responses to and
interpretations of secured-loan contracts. In particular, several states have
instituted various forms of legislation to limit deficiency judgments. 12 While
these actions can be understood simply as sympathetic responses to debtors'
plights, our analysis shows that they can also be interpreted as guaranteeing
that mortgages act as limited liability instruments and consequently that this
form of secured loan yields the advantages we have described in this paper.
Finally, this analysis is of relevance to the question of revision of
contractual duty in contract law. When a lender agrees to a reduction in the
payment required, in what sense is this renegotiated agreement an
enforceable contract? Can the lender subsequently demand the original
amounts based on the pre-existing duty rule? In the case of "matured and
liquidated" money debts, courts have had to find a modification of the terms
of the payment-even in the most minute detail of location of payment or
person to be paid-to serve as the consideration for the revised contract. 3 In
the absence of strategic considerations, there would be no economic
justification for allowing the revision of a liquidated money debt: One party's
loss would be the other's gain, and the foreknowledge of the possibility of
being held up would reduce parties' willingness to enter into contracts. 14 Our
analysis shows that revisions of money debts can serve a socially useful
purpose. It also suggests that in the case of secured loans, we should treat the
borrower's decision to forego default as the consideration in the revised
contract.

11. There is a major limitation to the applicability of this prediction: In the case of multiple
lenders to a single firm, secured loans will be used to make favored lenders more senior in the event
of bankruptcy. The interpretation of secured loans in such circumstances requires a much more
complex analysis. Investigations in which the competition among creditors constitutes the center of
a bankrupty analysis are Baird, The Uneasy Casefor Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127
(1986); Jackson, TranslatingAssets and Liabilities to the Bankruptcy Forum, 14 J. LEGAL STUn. 73 (1985).
For a formal economic analysis explicitly based on the inability of certain classes of creditors to
renegotiate (because of the transaction costs involved in getting together), see White, Public Policy
Toward Bankruptcy: Ale-First and Other Priority Rules, 11 BELLJ. EcON. 550 (1980).
12. Goldstein outlines some of the responses. Some states, such as California, have instituted
legislation prohibiting deficiency judgments outright in certain circumstances and limiting the sums
obtainable in other circumstances. Since this rule could be evaded by a mortgagee who took action
first against the mortgagor personally and only subsequently against the property for the balance of
the amount due, some states have enacted "one-action" rules, which require the mortgagee to
proceed against the property first, effectively limiting him to only one remedy. P. GOLDSTEIN, supra
note 9, at 444-45.
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VI
CONCLUSION

This article has developed a simple economic setting in which security
contracts with renegotiation dominate other simple contacts. These contracts

encourage the borrower to make proper investments in successful projects,
while allowing the lender to recapture some of the value of unsuccessful
projects through renegotiation of the loan under a threat of foreclosure.
This setting emphasizes a strategic approach to renegotiation. The
standard economic approach predicts that property rights will be assigned to
those parties predicted to have the highest valuation of them. Renegotiation
is, therefore, a technique for reallocating property in an efficient manner after
unexpected occurrences have rendered an initial allocation sub-optimal.
In contrast, our approach emphasizes that property rights may be assigned
initially on a strategic basis. In some circumstances it is desirable to assign
property not to the party who has the greatest ultimate use for the property,
but to the party who should be endowed with bargaining power in subsequent
periods. While a lender typically has less use for the secured property than
does a borrower, a security contract assigns the property right to the lender in
case of default in order to give the lender the power to extract as much value
as possible when default occurs.
The model has demonstrated that this arrangement can yield financing for
useful projects that would remain unfinanced under alternate arrangements.
This article has also briefly examined the consequences that arise from
variations in the rules for enforcing the provisions of secured loans. We have
shown that increasing the costliness of the foreclosure procedure reduces the
usefulness of the secured loan even if no loans ever proceed through
foreclosure: The added costs reduce the bargaining position of the creditor
when default occurs. This article has shown that automatic court protection
of creditors eliminates the usefulness of security by making it impossible for
creditor and debtor to share risks in an efficient manner.
Thus, a novel feature of our framework is that it makes possible a
comparison of the effectiveness of various legal regimes for handling default
and foreclosure. Future work will give a more detailed examination of the
variation in foreclosure laws in various jurisdictions and the effects on the
loan market.

